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REVISITING THE LEGAL LINK BETWEEN
GENETICS AND CRIME
DEBORAH W. DENNO*
I
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, convicted murderer Stephen Mobley became a cause c~lebre when
he appealed his death sentence before the Georgia Supreme Court.' According
to Mobley's counsel, the trial court should have enabled Mobley to be tested for
genetic deficiencies. The counsel's interest in genetics testing was prompted for
unusual reasons: Mobley's family history revealed generations of relatives with
serious behavioral disorders. Indications that Mobley shared a genetic
propensity for misconduct could help explain some of his troubling tendencies
and why he should not be executed.' In a highly publicized decision,3 the
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This article resulted from a Duke University School of Law Symposium on The Impact of
Behavioral Genetics on the Criminal Law. The symposium was hosted by Law and Contemporary
Problems and co-sponsored by The Institute of Genome Sciences and Policy's Center for Genomics
Ethics, Law, and Policy, as well as by the American Bar Association's Science and Technology Section.
I appreciate the suggestions and insights I received from the symposium's participants, as well as from
my colleagues Marianna Gebhardt, Peter Kougasian, and Ian Weinstein. For comments on earlier
versions of this article, I thank participants in workshops at Arizona State University College of Law,
Fordham Law School, New York Law School, and the William and Mary Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. I am most grateful to Marianna Gebhardt for her superb research support and assistance in
creating this article's Appendix, as well as to Marc Pane and Christina Newhard for their excellent
production of Charts 1-3. Thanks also go to Laurence Abraham, Dale Baich, Sean Farrell, Juan
Fernandez, Janice Greer, Gregory Kramer, and Marc Pane for providing research materials, and to
Kathleen Ruggiero and Kim Holder for their work on Charts 1-3. Fordham University School of Law
gave generous funding for this project.
1. Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995).
2. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Legal Implications of Genetics and Crime Research, in
GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 248, 248-64 (Gregory Bock & Jamie Goode
eds., 1996) (presented at the 1995 Ciba Foundation Symposium 194) (discussing the Mobley case in
light of historical and contemporary arguments concerning the use of genetics evidence in criminal law
cases). The news media focused on detailing the behavioral disorders across generations of the Mobley
family. See, e.g., Carolyn Abraham, DNA at 50: The First of a 3 Part Series, The Bad Seed, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), March 1, 2003, at F1 ("[Mobley's lawyer] knew that arguing a genetic defect would
never earn an acquittal. No credible expert would testify that genes made Mr. Mobley kill. But if there
was any evidence that bad behaviour ran in the Mobley family, it might hold up at the sentencing as a
mitigating factor."); Steve Connor, Do Your Genes Make You a Criminal?, INDEP. ON SUN. (London),
Feb. 12, 1995, at 19 ("'There is no legal defence to his crime,' says... Mobley's attorney. 'There is only
the mitigating factor of his family history. His actions may not have been a product of totally free will.'
Murder, rape, robbery, suicide, 'you name it,' the Mobley family has had it, he says."); Convicted Killer
Seeks Brain Test, TIMES (London), Feb. 14, 1995, at 6 ("Violence, aggression and anti-social behaviour
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Georgia Supreme Court rejected that reasoning and affirmed the trial court's
holding, explaining that the genetic theory involved in Mobley's case "will not
have reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty in the near future and...
Mobley could not show that such a stage will ever be reached."4
One year later, Mobley's family history evidence again became an issue.
This time, new counsel representing Mobley filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus claiming Mobley's trial counsel were inadequate for a range of reasons:
failing to research sufficiently Mobley's background for mitigating evidence,
neglecting to acquire funds so that a psychologist could provide expert
testimony during Mobley's sentencing phase, wrongly declining an offer of
financial assistance from Mobley's father to support Mobley's genetics testing
and raising an "unorthodox mitigating defense that attempted to show a
possible genetic basis for Mobley's conduct."'  The habeas court vacated
Mobley's death sentence on grounds that Mobley's trial counsel were
ineffective;' on appeal, though, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and
dominate the family tree of Stephen Mobley .... Lawyers acting for Mobley asked a court to allow
him to undergo neurological tests to determine whether he was suffering from an imbalance of brain
chemicals that may have contributed to his behaviour."); Michelle Henery, Killer Blamed His Family
History, TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 2, 2002, at 5 (According to Mobley's counsel, Mobley's criminality derived
from "four generations of Mobley men," either successful or violent, "including a murderer, a rapist, an
armed robber, spouse abusers, several substance abusers and Mobley's father, a self-made
millionaire."); Kathryn Holmquist, Nature, Nurture, the "Criminal Gene"--What Makes Men Violent?,
IRISH TIMES, May 9, 1996, at 12 ("After [Mobley] was sentenced to death, his lawyers won an appeal.
They argued that he was not acting on the basis of 'free will' but due to a genetic predilection.
Virtually his entire family, they said, were violent."); Minette Marrin, Freedom Is a Better Bet than the
Gene Genie, SUN. TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 6, 2002, at 3G ("Generations of Mobleys, starting with
[Stephen's] great-grandfather, had been antisocial and violent, and his lawyers tried to argue that he
was hard-wired to be bad.").
3. Various news accounts illustrated the degree of attention the Mobley case received. See, e.g.,
Mike Pezzella, Violence DNA Researchers Mum on Meeting, Hoping to Avoid Protests, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, Apr. 15, 1996, at 14 ("The [Mobley] case became a minor landmark when Mobley's...
attorney.., attempted to get Georgia to pay for a DNA analysis of Mobley in order to obtain evidence
based on four generations of violence and aggressive business behavior in his family."); Babs
Brockway, Mobley's Death Sentence Is Upheld, TIMES (Gainesville, Ga.), Mar. 18, 1995, at 1 ("The
[Mobley] case gained international attention when [Mobley's lawyer] Summer contended his defense
was hurt by Hall Superior Court Judge Andy Fuller's refusal to approve $1,000 for the tests ... [which]
could have shown that Mobley had a genetic predisposition toward violence."); Not by Our Genes
Alone, NEW SCI., Feb. 25, 1995, at 3 ("Mobley's case became headline news in Britain last week, thanks
to a scientific meeting on the links between genes and crime, held in London ..."); Kam Patel, Adrian
Raine & Steven Rose, Perspective: An Inside Job Or A Set-Up?, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPPLEMENT,
Feb. 10, 1995, at 16 ("[W]hat appears to be pretty much an open and shut case-even Mobeley [sic] has
never denied his guilt-has been catapulted on to the battlefield of a fierce worldwide debate."); see
also Sarah Boseley, Second Front: Genes In The Dock, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 13, 1995, at T2
("Even if [the Georgia Supreme Court turns down Mobley's -appeal], lawyers believe it is now no
longer a case of whether genetic evidence will be allowed in court but when."); Connor, supra note 2
("[Mobley's] last chance of reprieve rests with a plea from his lawyer that the murder was not the evil
result of free will but the tragic consequence of a genetic predisposition."); Edward Felsenthal, Legal
Beat: Man's Genes Made Him Kill, His Lawyers Claim, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1994, at B1 ("The
[Mobley] case seeks to break new legal ground by bringing into court a growing body of research
linking genes and aggressive behavior.").
4. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66.
5. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 463 (Ga. 1998).
6. Id. at 461.
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reinstated the sentence, concluding counsel had been adequate.7 Likewise, the
Georgia Supreme Court denied reconsideration of the potential for testing
Mobley for genetic deficiencies, but for a somewhat different reason than it had
expressed three years earlier.8 In the court's view, Mobley had in fact been"able to present the genetics theory" through a relative's testimony about the
family's generations of behavioral problems;9 however, even if the court had
allowed genetics testing, "there had been no showing that a geneticist would
have offered additional significant evidence."'" In March 2005, after more
appeals, Mobley was executed by lethal injection."
Mobley's request for genetics testing spawned an international debate on
the political and scientific acceptance of genetics evidence in the criminal law.12
Near the time of Mobley's 1994 appeal, for example, the Ciba Foundation 3
sponsored a symposium in London on the Genetics of Criminal and Antisocial
Behaviour. " Because the symposium examined the legal implications of
genetics and crime research" and contributed to the publicity surrounding the
Mobley case, 6 the issues discussed at Ciba are significant to this article. 7 The
7. Id. at 467.
8. Id. at 463-66.
9. Id. at 466; see also infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the testimony of Joyce
Ann Mobley Childers).
10. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 466.
11. Mark Davis, Final Appeals Fail; Killer Mobley Dies, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 2, 2005, at B3;
Mark Davis, Mobley Dies for 1991 Murder; Supreme Court Denies Last Appeals Half-Hour Before
Execution, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 2,2005, at 1JJ.
12. See, e.g., Mariya Moosajee, Violence-A Noxious Cocktail of Genes and the Environment, 96 J.
Roy. Soc'Y MED. 211, 213 (2003) ("[S]ince genetic make-up is predetermined, some might seek to
make genes an excuse for misbehavior .... The case of Stephen Mobley... is a case in point."); Sarah
Boseley, Genes' Link To Crime May Be Cited in Court, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 14, 1995, at 4
(describing the difficulties and misconceptions regarding genetic predisposition to criminal behavior
related by participants in the Ciba conference on the Genetics of Criminal and Antisocial Behaviour);
Connor, supra note 2 ("[A]t a closed meeting of scientists at the Ciba Foundation in London, Mobley's
family tree will again come under intense scrutiny, this time by researchers studying the link between
genes and violence."); Roger Highfield, Scientists Can Test Foetus For Violent Gene, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Feb. 14, 1995, at 4 ("Discovery of a genetic link to aggression may soon have an
impact on America's legal system.") (referring to Mobley); Kenan Malik, Refutation: No Such Thing as
a Born Killer, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 14, 1995, at 15 (describing the Mobley appeal and the
Ciba conference as being "[t]wo recent events [that] have revived the debate about whether criminal
behaviour is genetically determined"); Colin Wilson, Are Some People Born Criminal?, DAILY MAIL
(U.K.), Aug. 2, 2002, at 12 (considering "whether there is such a thing as a 'criminal gene"' to be "one
of the great debates of modern times"); see also Denno, supra note 2, at 251-53 (citing articles
discussing the controversy surrounding the Mobley case).
13. The Ciba Foundation is a scientific organization now called the Novartis Foundation.
Information on Novartis Foundation Symposia can be found at http://www.novartisfound.org.uk/
symp.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). For purposes of clarity, this article continues to refer to the Ciba
Foundation in the context of discussions about the Ciba conference.
14. The three-day Ciba Foundation symposium was held on February 14-16, 1995. Contents, in
GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 2, at v. The papers presented at
the symposium were published in Genetics of Criminal and Antisocial Behaviour. Id. For the purposes
of the symposium, I wrote a chapter about the Mobley case. See Denno, supra note 2, at 248.
15. See Denno, supra note 2, at 248.
16. For further descriptions of the debates surrounding the issue of genetics and crime outside the
context of the Mobley case but in the wake of the Ciba conference on the Genetics of Criminal and
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Ciba symposium was also relevant to the legal field as a whole because the
symposium's themes squarely addressed a topic that had seemed dormant for
years: the interdisciplinary links between genetics and crime. The twenty-five
symposium attendees represented a range of different academic areas, including
genetics, psychology, philosophy, and law.1" Their contributions are particularly
pertinent today, at the ten-year anniversary of the first Mobley appeal and as
Mobley's execution again draws public attention to his case.
Mobley's death stirs the genetics and crime debate with a key question:
How have courts and litigators treated genetics evidence in criminal cases
during the decade following Mobley's first trial? Much of the controversy
concerning Mobley was based on the presumption that such evidence would
skyrocket in use and abuse. The following pages seek to determine if such
forecasts have been realized.
In essence, this article takes up where the Ciba symposium's analysis of the
legal consequences of genetics and crime left off-to assess the kinds of
exchanges the Mobley case would provoke today. Contrary to predictions at
the time of Mobley's appeal, it appears that little has occurred in the area of
genetics and crime warranting the concern that Mobley generated. Of course,
the criminal justice system should remain alert to the potential hazards of
genetics evidence. Yet unsupported fears could also curtail some defendants'
constitutionally legitimate attempts to submit mitigating factors in their death
penalty cases, in particular, genetics evidence that could validate the existence
of more traditionally accepted mitigating conditions, such as mental illness.
Presumably, judges and juries would be less likely to think that a defendant is
feigning states such as schizophrenia or alcoholism if such disorders commonly
occurred across generations of the defendant's family.
Discussions of an interdisciplinary subject of this sort require clear
terminology, especially because of the close ties between biological and social
factors and the frequent muddling of the terms "biological" and "genetic."
Therefore, this introduction briefly sets forth definitions of key terms according
to how they are used in much of the research literature and in this article. In
general, social variables, such as socioeconomic status, consist of environmental
Antisocial Behaviour, see Clive Cookson, Controversial Search for the Criminal Gene: A Conference
the Americans Would not Allow, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 14, 1995, at 8 ("Ten of the 13 speakers [at the
Ciba conference] are from the US, where criminal genetics is a particularly controversial issue."); Patel
et al., supra note 3, at 16 (exploring opposing viewpoints on the connections between genes and crime
and the implications of such on the legal system); Richard W. Stevenson, Researchers See Gene Link to
Violence but Are Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 29 ("Researchers [at the Ciba symposium]
said.., there was tentative but growing evidence of a genetic basis for some criminal and aggressive
behavior. But clearly mindful of the controversy on this issue, most ... emphasized that the 'nature
versus nurture' debate was not an either-or proposition in this case."); Tom Wilkie, Genes Link to
Violence and Crime Condemned, INDEP. (London), Feb. 15, 1995, HOME, at 2 (noting that the
controversy surrounding the issues discussed at the Ciba symposium had "now reached the European
Parliament").
17. See infra Part III.
18. Participants, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 2, at vii.
[Vol. 69:209
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influences on a person's behavior.19 Biological variables, on the other hand,
constitute "physiological, biochemical, neurological, and genetic" effects on
how an individual may act.2 Genetic factors are a subset of biological variables,
distinguishable because they are inherited; in contrast, social factors are not
inherited. 1 All these categories-social, biological, and genetic-are related in
interesting ways. For example, being male is a genetic attribute that strongly
predicts crime.2 Yet most men never commit an officially recorded crime,
particularly a violent crime. 3 Likewise, other biological factors and a wide
range of social factors mediate the relationship between sex and criminal
behavior, so much so that social variables greatly dominate a researcher's
ability to determine who among a small group of people will engage in
criminality."
A common stereotype is that an individual's "genotype" or "genetic
constitution"2 is static, as though there is a "crime gene" that "hard-wires"
certain people to violate the law.2" But this perspective, however entrenched in
the public's mind, has no scientific support. Rather, an overwhelming amount
of evidence shows that "environments influence gene expression." 7 In other
words, an individual's genetic structure may act developmentally and
probabilistically in the context of social variables by potentially predisposing an
individual to certain behavioral tendencies, such as shyness.28  In turn,"genotype influences societal response," which explains, for example, why men
are far more likely than women to wear a tuxedo rather than a dress at formal
events. 9 These kinds of interlinkages between genotype and the environment
become helpful in assessing how genetics evidence may be viewed in a criminal
law case such as Mobley.
19. Jasmine A. Tehrani & Sarnoff A. Mednick, Crime Causation: Biological Theories, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 292, 292 (Joshua Dressier et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 80, 80-180 (1994) (examining a broad range of statistics on sex differences in crime).
23. See id.
24. See DEBORAH W. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE: FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 7-28
(1990) (detailing a large longitudinal study of various biological and sociological predictors of sex
differences in crime).
25. GREGORY CAREY, HUMAN GENETICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 68 (2003).
26. Denno, supra note 2, at 254; see also Holmquist, supra note 2 (referring to a "criminal gene" in
the title of a news article about the Mobley case); Marrin, supra note 2 ("[Mobley's] lawyers tried to
argue that [Mobley] was hard-wired to be bad.").
27. CAREY, supra note 25, at 452.
28. Denno, supra note 2, at 254; see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Genetic and Environmental Influences
on Antisocial Behaviors: Evidence from Behavioral-Genetic Research, in 55 ADVANCES IN GENETICS
41, 41-104 (Jeffrey C. Hall ed., 2005) (analyzing the interaction between genes and the environment
with respect to antisocial behavior).
29. CAREY, supra note 25, at 452. For an excellent discussion and analysis of these issues, see
Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405
(2005).
Winter/Spring 20061
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Part II of this article briefly reviews the facts and legal arguments in Mobley.
Part III addresses the primary issues that concerned the court in Mobley, noting
that many of the original reasons for the controversy over the potential use of
genetics evidence remain the same as they did in 1994. Part IV discusses the
twenty-seven key genetics and crime cases occurring between 1994 and 2004,
since Mobley spurred the topical dispute. These cases, which are surprisingly
small in number, share several important characteristics: they overwhelmingly
constitute murder convictions in which defendants attempted to use genetics
evidence as a mitigating factor in a death penalty case (as Mobley did), and the
evidence is introduced mostly to verify a condition (such as a type of mental
illness) that is commonly acceptable for mitigation. Part V concludes that,
contrary to some commentators' warnings during the first Mobley trial, the last
decade has not revealed a legally irresponsible application of genetics factors in
criminal cases. Rather, courts continue to regard genetics variables skeptically,
and society still embraces the same political and moral concerns over the role of
such information. At the same time, courts have failed to provide sound and
conceptually consistent reasons for denying defendants' offers of genetics
evidence.
Unwarranted constraints on the admissibility of genetics evidence in death
penalty cases can undercut some defendants' efforts to fight their executions.
For example, genetics evidence can help validate some traditionally accepted
mitigating factors (such as certain psychiatric or behavioral disorders) that can
otherwise be difficult for defendants to prove. By imposing unreasonable
limitations on genetics arguments, the criminal justice system may be
undermining the very principles and progressive thinking the cap on genetics
evidence was originally intended to achieve.
II
THE STEPHEN MOBLEY CASE
The facts and legal arguments raised in Mobley provide a broad context for
analyzing the applicability of genetics evidence for purposes of mitigation. On
February 17, 1991, Stephen Mobley entered a Domino's Pizza store in
Oakwood, Hall County, Georgia, to steal money. In the course of the robbery,
he shot John Collins, the store's manager, in the back of the head as Collins
begged for his life. Mobley was caught a month later and immediately
confessed to the crime.3"
The two court-appointed attorneys assigned to Mobley, Daniel Summer and
Charles Taylor,3 faced a daunting dilemma. There was little about Mobley that
aroused legal sympathy or provided "'traditional mitigation evidence.' 3 2
30. Mobley v. State, 426 S.E.2d 150, 151 (Ga. 1993); Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga. 1995);
Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. 1998); Denno, supra note 2, at 251.
31. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463; see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
32. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463.
[Vol. 69:209
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Mobley's father was a multimillionaire.3 White and young (age twenty-five at
the time of his crime), Mobley had recently left a home of economic privilege34
having experienced "a childhood standard of living [that] had ranged from
middle class to affluent."3  Mobley's parents and sister, as well as Mobley
himself, stated that he had never been neglected or abused, sexually or
physically. 6 Rather, Mobley showed an early and continuous history of
personal and behavioral disorders that became ever more troubling with age.
As a young child, Mobley cheated, lied, and stole. Such conduct worsened in
adolescence, resulting in prison sentences for forgery and culminating in
numerous armed robberies during Mobley's mid-twenties. Following this years-
long crime spree, Mobley robbed and murdered Collins. While awaiting trial
for Collins's death, Mobley's aggression was out of control: He fought
continually with other inmates, sodomized his cellmate, tattooed the word
"Domino" on his own back, and verbally taunted and threatened prison guards.
As a youth and as an adult, seemingly no amount of counseling or punishment
could contain Mobley's outbursts.3
Mobley did have one advantage at the time of his trial-his attorneys,
Summer and Taylor," proved to be creative and concerned advocates
determined to put forward the best case that someone like Mobley could
possibly have. According to Summer's account of his trial tactics, he and
Mobley "realized that they had no legal defense to the armed robbery and
murder charges because of Mobley's numerous confessions, and they also
recognized that they had no traditional 'mitigating' evidence that they could
offer the jury to convince them to spare [Mobley's] life."3 9 In light of these
circumstances, Summer attempted to collect a wide range of other information
in order to provide some kind of explanation for Mobley's history and
disposition.4" In the course of analyzing Mobley's family, for example, Summer
33. Denno, supra note 2, at 251.
34. Id.; Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-64.
35. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 464.
36. Id. at 463. Journalist Tom Junod depicted Mobley's comfortable childhood in blunter terms:
Deprivation? Want? Hey, they may explain your typical murderer, your average everyday
ghetto shooter, but they sure ... don't explain Tony Mobley. Nothing does. Sure, his father's
hard and his mother harder; sure, they divorced when Tony was at a delicate age; sure, he
resents.., his older sister. But please, Dr. Freud, you have to believe him: There is nothing
any of them did-father, mother, sister, grandpa, grandma, maiden aunt-to deserve him. He
didn't get beat, he didn't get [sexually abused]; no, beating and [sexual abuse], they were what
he did, and that's how it has always been.
Tom Junod, Pull the Trigger, GENTLEMEN'S Q., July 1994, at 92-94.
37. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-64; Denno, supra note 2, at 251-52; Daniel A. Summer, The Use of
Human Genome Research in Criminal Defense and Mitigation of Punishment, in GENETICS AND
CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 182, 189 (Jeffrey R.
Botkin et al. eds., 1999).
38. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463.
39. Summer, supra note 37, at 189; see also Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-66 (recognizing the lack of
available mitigating evidence in Mobley's background).
40. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-66.
Winter/Spring 2006]
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interviewed Joyce Ann Mobley Childers, the first cousin of Mobley's father. 1
At Mobley's sentencing hearing, Ms. Childers testified that four generations of
Mobleys-including Mobley's uncles, aunts, and a grandfather-consistently
engaged in acts of violence, aggression, and behavioral disorder. 2 Such
behavior ranged from serious crimes (murder and rape) to extreme spousal
abuse, alcoholism, explosive temperaments, and antisocial conduct. 3 At the
same time, a substantial number of Mobleys were highly successful at business."
This split created a family reputation of peculiar renown: the Mobleys were
either behaviorally disturbed or business achievers, and, in a number of cases,
they were both."5
What instigated Stephen Mobley's violence? No one knew, but Summer
attempted to find out. He and Taylor requested experts and financial support
of $1,000 so that scientific tests could be conducted to determine if Mobley
showed any kind of genetic or neurochemical imbalance. 6
In an effort to bolster the demonstrated need for funding, Summer
introduced into evidence a then-recent article by Han Brunner and others,
published in the prestigious journal Science.7  The article (and other
publications following it) 8 reported the results of genetics testing of a Dutch
kindred of four generations.49 The kindred included fourteen males affected by
a syndrome characterized by borderline mental retardation and serious
behavioral dysfunction. Brunner and his co-authors had sufficient
documentation on eight of these males to note more specific and consistent
disorders among them, including impulsivity, verbal and physical aggression,
and violence.5" A number of the kindred's males also had committed serious
crimes. One man had raped his sister and, after he was institutionalized,
41. Id. at 465; Denno, supra note 2, at 251. At the time of her trial testimony, Joyce Ann went by
the name of Joyce Ann Mobley Childers. Denno, supra note 2, at 251. The Turpin court, however,
refers to her using two different last names: Joyce Ann Elders, see Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 465, and Joyce
Ann Childers, see id. at 467 (basically the name she used at trial). The court does not explain the
discrepancy in names.
42. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 465.
43. Id.; Denno, supra note 2, at 251 & fig.1.
44. Denno, supra note 2, at 251 & fig.1.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 252; Summer, supra note 37, at 189.
47. H. G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural
Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 SCIENCE 578 (1993) [hereinafter Brunner et al., Abnormal
Behavior]; see also Paul S. Appelbaum, Behavioral Genetics and the Punishment of Crime, 56 PSYCH.
SERVICES 25, 25 (2005) (discussing the Brunner et al. study).
48. For a general overview of the research, see Han G. Brunner, MAOA Deficiency and Abnormal
Behaviour: Perspectives on an Association, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR,
supra note 2, at 155, 155-67 [hereinafter Brunner, MAOA Deficiency]. For details on the studies, see
Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior, supra note 47; H. G. Brunner et al., X-Linked Borderline Mental
Retardation with Prominent Behavioral Disturbance: Phenotype, Genetic Localization, and Evidence for
Disturbed Monoamine Metabolism, 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1032 (1993) [herinafter Brunner et al.,
X-Linked].
49. Brunner, MAOA Deficiency, supra note 48, at 156.
50. Id.
[Vol. 69:209
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stabbed the institution's warden in the chest. Another man habitually forced
his sisters to undress at knife point, while another tried to kill his boss. Yet two
more were arsonists and several regularly groped or grasped female family
members.5 Tests on these males showed a defect on the X chromosome,
known as monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) deficiency, which was passed from
mother to son and linked to regulating aggression. 2
According to Summer, it seemed reasonable to investigate whether Mobley
was also afflicted by the MAOA deficiency or by a comparable kind of
disability. Indeed, a co-author of the Science article" had volunteered to
perform genetics testing on Mobley to determine whether Mobley shared the
same or a similar kind of genetic mutation.' Other researchers offered to
assess whether Mobley demonstrated abnormal levels of additional kinds of
chemicals that can be linked to aggression, such as serotonin, noradrenaline,
and adrenaline.55 As the Supreme Court of Georgia explained,
[Summer's] strategy in the penalty phase centered around the following theme:
Mobley has a personality disorder that has affected his behavior since he was a child,
this behavior may be the result of a genetic problem that he cannot control, the jury
should show him mercy because people with personality disorders tend to "mellow
out" as they age, and Mobley has accepted responsibility for his crimes by cooperating
with the police and offering to plead guilty. 56
Of course this plan failed in Mobley's case."7 Yet the implications of the court's
holding raise many issues that were underscored by the Ciba symposium 8 and
that remain relevant today.
III
ISSUES RAISED BY MOBLEY
A. Mobley Themes at Ciba
Several themes that emerged at the Ciba symposium were fueled specifically
by Mobley. First, the symposium's mere occurrence highlights the unusual
interdisciplinary concern with the possible link between genetics and crime.59
The second theme was the narrowness with which the press and public viewed
the Mobley case, focusing mainly on the tie between the case and the Brunner
article in Science. This emphasis was unfortunate but not surprising, partly
51. Brunner et al., X-Linked, supra note 48, at 1035.
52. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior, supra note 47, at 578-79.
53. See id. at 578.
54. Denno, supra note 2, at 252. The co-author who volunteered to test Mobley was Xandra
Breakefield. Id.
55. Id.
56. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 466 (Ga. 1998).
57. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 12, 16 and accompanying text.
59. Typically, symposia at the Ciba Foundation do not involve topics that would interest
nonscientists. See The Novartis Foundation, http://www.novartisfound.org.uk (last visited Sept. 25,
2005). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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because Mobley's counsel had introduced Brunner's study into evidence in
support of a request for funds for genetic and neurochemical testing of
Mobley." Yet medical analyses of Mobley were intended to be far broader
than simply an investigation of MAOA deficiency, in part because Mobley did
not appear to fit the common characteristics of an individual suffering from
MAOA deficiency syndrome. At the Ciba symposium" and in the Mobley case
itself,62 commentators emphasized that Mobley's tested IQ was average, a sharp
contrast to the borderline IQ shown by the males in Brunner's study.63
Likewise, Mobley's disorder, if it had any genetic basis whatsoever, seemed to
be transmitted through males, not through females.64 Therefore, the proposed
Mobley evaluations were geared toward uncovering a wide range of
neurochemical imbalances, the origins of which could be biological or even
environmental.
The Ciba symposium prompted interest in a third theme-the future legal
use of genetics evidence. A symposium chapter, Legal Implications of Genetics
and Crime Research,65 estimated that after Mobley, attorneys would increasingly
attempt to introduce genetics evidence in criminal cases.66 This estimate was
not based on the perceived quality or moral acceptability of the evidence, but
simply on a belief that defense counsel would progressively investigate scientific
discoveries in their various efforts to provide mitigation for their death row
clients.67
B. Mobley Themes Since Ciba
Historically, genetics evidence has been no stranger to law.66 Now, however,
the themes of the Ciba symposium take on new significance as research grows.
Genetics studies are gaining in sophistication,69 and criminal defense attorneys
are becoming more interdisciplinary."
60. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. The MAOA deficiency issue has come about in
other cases. See Appelbaum, supra note 47, at 25-27.
61. Denno, supra note 2, at 252.
62. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 463 (Ga. 1998) ("[P]sychological reports showed that
Mobley had an average IQ .... Although some psychological reports early in Mobley's childhood
suggested that he might have a learning disability or organic brain disorder, later reports found no
evidence of either.").
63. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior, supra note 47, at 578.
64. Denno, supra note 2, at 251 & fig.1.
65. Id. at 248.
66. Id. at 252.
67. Id. at 252-55.
68. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze either the research or the publications
examining the link between genetics and crime in legal cases. For a few overviews of this literature, see
CAREY, supra note 25; Denno, supra note 2; Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 29; Moffitt, supra note 28;
see also Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the
Genetic Revolution, 52 DuKE L.J. 1031, 1039-40 (2003) (describing XYY Syndrome-related studies in
the context of the early history of genetic defenses in criminal trials).
69. For recent research reviews, see CAREY supra note 25, at 431-57; Tehrani & Mednick, supra
note 19, at 292-302; Moffitt, supra note 28, at 41-104; Terrie E. Moffitt, The New Look of Behavioral
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Despite the enhanced acceptance of genetics research, however, genetics
evidence71 continues to be plagued by the same problems and concerns that
were raised ten years ago at the Ciba symposium. Such concerns include the
following: (1) the historical association of genetics evidence with abuses by the
Nazis during the Holocaust; (2) the meaning accorded the evidence in terms of
the potential chilling of society's notions of free will; (3) the possible
stigmatizing effect of such evidence, exemplified by past efforts to screen and
genetically follow targeted children or to corral through preventive detention
those individuals deemed genetically predisposed to violence; (4) the absolution
of societal responsibility for the social and economic factors that lead to crime if
legal actors find a "genetics" defense acceptable; and (5) suggestions that juries
may be more readily swayed in court by genetic or biological studies because
such research seems more objective and precise than social or behavioral
factors.72 All five issues, which remain unresolved, influence how the criminal
justice system perceives genetics research.
At the same time, however, modern research continues to emphasize the
importance of environmental effects on behavior,73 thereby debunking the
common myth that an individual's genetic structure is static. 4 Indeed, during
the past decade, criminological investigations have increasingly incorporated
genetic, biological, and social factors as vehicles for understanding crime.
When these studies employ many different kinds of variables, their results show
that genetics and biology continually accentuate the significance of social
factors on behavior-so much so that the three interactive categories
("genetic," "biological," and "social") are often difficult to separate and
decipher.75 In light of these kinds of discoveries, the next part examines cases
that have used genetics evidence since the time Mobley was decided.
Genetics in Developmental Psychopathology: Gene-Environment Interplay in Antisocial Behaviors, 131
PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 533 (2005).
70. See Summer, supra note 37, at 182-90.
71. Of course, there are vastly different types of genetics evidence, ranging from family history to
modern medical testing. It is artificial to aggregate all the research under one heading. This type of
lumping also confuses debates about when and where the evidence should be appropriately applied.
The umbrella heading of "genetics evidence" is used in this article, however, to make general points,
while recognizing that the points made could differ in their accuracy depending on the type and quality
of evidence being discussed.
72. Denno, supra note 2, at 254; see also infra note 189 (describing the reactions to a 1995
University of Maryland conference on The Meaning and Significance of Research on Genetics and
Criminal Behavior, in which the public and some conference participants voiced many of these same
five concerns).
73. See DENNO, supra note 24.
74. Denno, supra note 2, at 254.
75. For examinations of the relationship among these variables, see CAREY supra note 25; DENNO,
supra note 24; Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 29; Moffitt, supra note 28.
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IV
GENETICS EVIDENCE CASES: 1994-2004
The various arguments about the role of genetics in the criminal law are still
largely theoretical. Genetics evidence has not gained widespread acceptance in
current case law despite Mobley and the few decisions since that have
resembled it. Those criminal cases that have used genetics evidence, however,
reflect the interdisciplinary efforts of attorneys to help explain defendants'
behaviors. Twenty-seven criminal cases have referred to genetics evidence over
the past decade-that is, since Mobley was first decided in 1994 to the end of
2004.6
A. An Overview of the Genetics Evidence Cases
The Appendix7 7 and Charts 1-371 give an aggregate overview of the cases
involving the twenty-seven male defendants. As Chart 1 shows, most of the
cases are appellate court decisions in which the defendant either received the
death penalty (twenty-one cases) or life in prison (three cases). 9  This
76. These cases, which are summarized in the Appendix and in Charts 1-3, infra, were compiled
using legal research databases only. Other cases may exist in which genetic predisposition evidence
was at issue or potentially could have been at issue; however, such cases were either not published or
were not made known publicly in a way that made them readily verifiable. (A general internet search
turned up references to cases in which genetics evidence was relevant; in most instances, however,
efforts to locate such cases on Westlaw or LexisNexis were unsuccessful.) The twenty-seven cases
discussed in this article also do not include Mobley, 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995), which already has been
examined in some detail, or other decisions in which genetics evidence may have been an issue in a
context not relevant to this article. For example, in People v. Rodriguez, 764 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2003), the New York Supreme Court held a defendant may be compelled to provide a blood sample
for DNA testing so the defendant's DNA could be compared to DNA evidence from a crime scene. Id.
at 311-15. The court ruled that the defendant's DNA could be used only for that criminal proceeding,
however, and could not be placed into a DNA database for comparison with DNA evidence from other
unsolved crimes. Results of DNA testing must be kept confidential-defendant has an "'exclusive
property right' to control dissemination of his genetic makeup." Id. at 311. In essence, the opinion
concerns privacy rights and DNA samples, as well as ways in which genetic material has been abused in
the past. Id. at 307-15.
77. See infra p. 239.
78. See infra pp. 221, 223, 224.
79. See infra Chart 1 and app. In twenty-one of the twenty-seven examined cases, the defendant
received the death penalty. See Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, stay denied, Dennis v. Budge, 542 U.S. 959 (2004); Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1223
(9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), affig in part, rev'g in part,
Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Hendricks v. Calderon, 864 F. Supp. 929,
931 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111 (1996); Fudge
v. State, 120 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Ark. 2003); Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 980 (Fla. 2001); People v.
Armstrong, 700 N.E.2d 960, 963 (I11. 1998); People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750, 750 (I11. 1995); Stevens
v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002); Benefiel v. State, 716 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ind. 1999); State v.
Manning, 03-1982 (La. 10/19/04); 885 So. 2d 1044, 1057, cert. denied, Manning v. Louisiana, No. 04-8851,
2005 U.S. LEXIS 3059 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2005); Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 2 (Miss. 1995); State v.
Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485, 485 (Mo. 2000); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 65-66 (N.J. 1999); State
v. Hartman, 476 S.E.2d 328, 331 (N.C. 1996); State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121,
792 N.E.2d 1081, at 30; State v. Spivey, 692 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ohio 1998); State v. Wilson, No. Civ.A.
92CA005396, 1994 WL 558568, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1994); Von Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d
738, 740 (S.C. 2004), cert. denied, South Carolina v. Von Dohlen, No. 04-937, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2695
(U.S. Mar. 21, 2005); Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Alley v. State,
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breakdown in disposition is critical because it indicates that genetics evidence is
submitted primarily as a mitigating factor in death penalty cases rather than as a
defense relating to the defendant's level of culpability at the trial court level.
The criteria for evaluating and admitting mitigating evidence are far broader
and more flexible than those used for defenses."0
CHART 1:
SEVERITY OF SENTENCING BY NUMBER OF CASES
Death (21)
Life (3)
0Acquitted (1)Z
Idl
I-
Z 35 years (1)
r n
t Driving license 
revoked (1)
--. -
0 5 10 15 20 25
1 NUMBER OF CASES 1
958 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004),
cert. denied, Hall v. Texas, No. 04-8762, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5073 (U.S. June 27, 2005). In three cases, the
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Davis v. State, No. M2003-00744-CCA-R3-PC, 2004
WL 253396, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2004); State v. Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2000); State v. Arausa, No. 2002-439113 (Dist. Ct. Lubbock County July 5, 2002), affd,
Arausa v. State, No. 07-02-0396-CR, 2003 WL 21803322 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2003). In one case, the
defendant was acquitted. State v. DeAngelo, No. CR 97010866S, 2000 WL 973104, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 20, 2000). In one case, the defendant was sentenced to thirty-five years of imprisonment.
People v. Hammerli, 662 N.E.2d 452, 452 (I11. App. Ct. 1996). Finally, in one case, the defendant's
driving privileges remained suspended. Sanchez v. Ryan, 734 N.E.2d 920, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
80. Mitigation evidence can be introduced during the penalty phase of a death penalty case to
support attorneys' explanations for why a defendant should not be executed. LINDA E. CARTER &
ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 137 (2004). The evidence,
which is typically introduced through the use of expert testimony, focuses on a potentially wide range
of individualized circumstances-for example, that the defendant had no prior criminal record, came
from an abusive home, is remorseful, will not be dangerous in the future, is young, has a mental
disorder, or suffers from any one of various life circumstances. Id. at 137-38. Although the Supreme
Court permits substantial flexibility in the kind of evidence that can be admitted for mitigation
purposes, the Court also allows states considerable discretion in how that evidence can be structured.
Id. A substantial case law and literature on this topic are discussed in detail elsewhere. See generally
id. at 137-56 (providing a general overview of the key cases and literature on mitigation evidence in
death penalty cases).
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Chart 2 indicates that most of the genetics evidence is applied to validate the
existence of a serious condition, typically a mental illness or addiction, which
the defendant could introduce as mitigating evidence in a death penalty case or
at trial, irrespective of the genetics issue. For example, the majority of cases
involve a mental disorder of some sort, such as depression (three cases),"mental illness" in general (three cases), or other problems reflecting a range of
conditions. Notably, four cases concern a defendant's arguing a genetic
predisposition to alcoholism.8"
81. See infra Chart 2 and app. Genetics evidence has been used to validate the existence of a wide
range of serious conditions. See Dennis ex rel. Butko, 378 F.3d at 895 (Berzon, J., concurring) (mental
illness); Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228-29 (predisposition towards violence); Hendricks, 864 F. Supp. at
935 (mental illness); Fudge, 120 S.W.3d at 602-03 (violence towards women); DeAngelo, 2000 WL
973104, at *6 (bipolar disorder); Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 996 (porphyria); Armstrong, 700 N.E.2d 970
(alcoholism); Franklin, 656 N.E.2d at 761 (mental illness, predisposition towards violence); Sanchez,
734 N.E.2d at 922 (alcohol tolerance); Hammerli, 662 N.E.2d at 456 (severe mood disorder); Stevens,
770 N.E.2d at 750 (dissociative disorder); Benefiel, 716 N.E.2d at 913 (schizotypal personality disorder);
Manning, 03-1982 (La. 10/19/04); 885 So. 2d at 1097 (alcoholism); Billiot, 655 So. 2d at 8
(schizophrenia); Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d at 509 (depression); Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 71 (pedophilia);
Hartman, 476 S.E.2d at 342 (alcoholism); Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d
1081, at 113 (schizophrenia); Spivey, 692 N.E.2d at 165 (extra Y chromosome); Wilson, 1994 WL
558568, at *43 (alcoholism); Von Dohlen, 602 S.E.2d at 741-42 (depression, mental disorders);
Cauthern, 145 S.W.3d at 588 (impulsive behavior); Davis, 2004 WL 253396, at *4 (depression, mental
illness); Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d at 598 (delusional disorder); Alley, 958 S.W.2d at 140-43 (physical
abnormalities, neurosis, Multiple Personality Disorder); Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 32-33 (Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome, Fragile X Syndrome, Klinefelter's Syndrome, extra Y chromosome); Arausa, No. 07-02-
0396-CR, 2003 WL 21803322, at *4 (propensity of abused to become abusers).
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CHART 2:
REASONS FOR INTRODUCING GENETICS EVIDENCE BY NUMBER OF CASES
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Chart 3 provides information on the nature of the evidence the defendant
seeks to admit. Most of the information is based on some kind of expert
evaluation or family history (eleven cases each, respectively), rather than a
medical study of the defendant.8" This revelation is important to the extent that
both the judiciary and the public appear more concerned about the direct
medical testing of a defendant than, for example, descriptive accounts of the
defendant's family history. Regardless, both direct testing and family history
strongly reflect environmental influences. 3
CHART 3:
NATURE OF EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE ADMITTED BY NUMBER OF CASES
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82. See infra Chart 3 and app. Chart 3 illustrates the frequency with which defendants sought to
admit different forms of genetics evidence. The total number will be more than the number of
examined cases (twenty-seven), because in some cases the defense attempted to introduce more than
one form. Defendants sought to admit expert testimony regarding a direct evaluation of the defendant
in eleven instances. See DeAngelo, 2000 WL 973104, at *6; Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 995; Hammerli, 662
N.E.2d at 456; Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 750; Manning, 03-1982 (La. 10/19/04); 885 So. 2d at 1097; Billiot,
655 So. 2d at 8; Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 71; Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792
N.E.2d 1081, at $ 113; Spivey, 692 N.E.2d at 165; Alley, 958 S.W.2d at 140-43; Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 32-
33. Defendants also attempted to introduce evidence regarding their family histories in eleven
instances. See Hendricks, 864 F. Supp. at 935; Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 995; Armstrong, 700 N.E.2d at 970;
Franklin, 656 N.E.2d at 761; Sanchez, 734 N.E.2d at 922-23; Benefiel, 716 N.E.2d at 913; Hartman, 476
S.E.2d at 342; Wilson, 1994 WL 558568, at *43; Cauthern, 145 S.W.3d at 588; Davis, 2004 WL 253396, at
*4; Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d at 598. Defendants attempted to introduce evidence regarding their
behavioral histories twice. See Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228-29; Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d at 509.
Defendants also attempted to introduce their medical records in two instances. See Benefiel, 716
N.E.2d at 913; Von Dohlen, 602 S.E.2d at 741-42. One defendant attempted to introduce medical
studies as evidence. See Arausa, 2003 WL 21803322, at *4. One case did not describe the nature of the
evidence sought to be introduced. See Fudge, 120 S.W.3d 600. Finally, one case examined did not
involve the introduction of genetics evidence, genetics being mentioned only in passing. See Dennis ex
rel. Butko, 378 F.3d at 895 (Berzon, J., concurring).
83. For further discussion of the tendency of individuals to overplay the powerful effect of biology
on behavior, see Deborah W. Denno, Commentary, in UNDERSTANDING CRIME: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 175, 175-80 (Susan Guarino-Ghezzi & A. Javier Trevifio eds., 2005).
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Lastly, the Appendix includes seven cases' that make only passing
references to genetics evidence. Typically in these cases courts merely listed
the genetics evidence among the mitigating factors offered by the defense
during the sentencing or penalty phases of a death penalty trial. In the
remaining twenty cases, genetics evidence is an issue of varying significance.
Even when the genetics evidence is not pivotal, however, subtleties in the
opinions of all twenty-seven cases may provide some insight concerning courts'
future stances towards genetic and environmental factors as mitigation.
B. Tactical Strategies for Using Genetics Evidence
As a tactical strategy, the twenty-seven cases showed genetics evidence
employed in three primary ways: (1) to support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, (2) to provide proof and diagnosis of a defendant's genetic
condition, or (3) to indicate some likelihood of the defendant's future
dangerousness. Any association between the type of strategy and the court's
acceptance of the genetics evidence is difficult to garner, given the range of
other factors influencing these cases.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Nine cases involved petitions and appeals by defendants based on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In some of these cases, the court held that
including genetics evidence was a valid defensive strategy. In Stevens v. State,5
for example, defendant's counsel had presented the defendant as a "passive
victim of abuse," based in part on testimony from a psychologist who stated the
defendant's genetic predisposition was partly to blame for his behavior." The
court held that this defense strategy was sound and affirmed the lower court's
denial of post-conviction relief.8"
Other ineffective assistance of counsel claims were based on the failure to
present genetics evidence adequately. The court in Von Dohlen v. State8
remanded the defendant's case due to his counsel's failure to sufficiently
prepare a defense expert witness for sentencing-phase testimony regarding the
extent of the defendant's mental illness.89 The remand was based in part on
84. DeAngelo, 2000 WL 973104, at *6; Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 997; Manning, 03-1982 (La. 10/19/04);
885 So. 2d at 1097; Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 71; Wilson, 1994 WL 558568, at *43; Davis, 2004 WL
253396, at *4; Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d at 598. Although these cases reference genetics evidence only in
passing, some of the cases are relevant nonetheless to discussions that appear elsewhere in this article's
analysis.
85. 770 N.E.2d at 739.
86. Id. at 754.
87. Id. at 755. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d at 739, may be seen as implicit approval of a genetics
defense because the court did not consider a defense theory partially based on genetics evidence to
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Yet the theory was obviously considered unsuccessful,
nonetheless.
88. 602 S.E.2d 738 (S.C. 2004), cert. denied, South Carolina v. Von Dohlen, No. 04-937, 2005 U.S.
LEXIS 2695 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005).
89. Id. at 746.
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subsequent testimony from the expert witness that if he had been given certain
medical and psychiatric records that were available before the trial, he would
have diagnosed the defendant with a far more serious mental illness.9" These
records indicated, in part, the defendant's genetic predisposition for mental
disorders.91
In other cases, however, courts placed less importance on genetics evidence.
In particular, these courts rejected defendants' petitions or appeals claiming
their counsels' ineffectiveness in failing to offer mitigating genetics evidence
during the penalty phase. In State v. Ferguson,92 for example, the defendant
argued that his counsel should have investigated and presented information
concerning the defendant's genetic predisposition to a major depressive
disorder.93 The court concluded that because sufficient mitigation evidence had
been introduced, the loss of this additional predisposition evidence did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.' In Benefiel v. State,9" the genetics
evidence involved the defendant's predisposition to a personality disorder.9"
Testimony regarding this predisposition had been offered during the guilt
phase, and the court was satisfied that the jury had been able to consider it in
the sentencing phase, even though it was not reintroduced; its absence from that
phase had therefore not affected the jury's sentencing recommendation.97 In
People v. Franklin" the court held that, even if the defendant's counsel had
investigated and offered such mitigating evidence as the defendant's "family's
history of mental illness and violence," it would have made no difference to the
jury's recommended sentence.9 Similarly, in Landrigan v. Stewart00 the court
determined that evidence of the defendant's alleged genetic predisposition to
violence would have been unlikely to affect the outcome of the defendant's
case. 101
Landrigan's procedural aspects are particularly interesting because the
appellate court opinion cites Mobley as precedent." 2 Timothy Landrigan was
90. Id. at 741.
91. Id. at 741-42.
92. 20 S.W.3d 485 (Mo. 2000).
93. Id. at 509.
94. Id.
95. 716 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. 1999).
96. Id. at 913.
97. Id.
98. 656 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. 1995).
99. Id. at 761.
100. 272 F.3d 1221, 1221 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir.
2005). The Ninth Circuit recently issued an order on this case. Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th
Cir. 2006)(en banc)(affirming in part and reversing in part district court's denial of a capital habeas
petition because defendant demonstrated colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during
penalty phase based on counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence including
defendant's family history and mental illness, which could have resulted in a sentence other than
death).
101. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228.
102. Id. at 1228 n.4 (citing Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 458 (Ga. 1998)).
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convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1993,03 one year before
Mobley." ' After the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Landrigan's conviction
and sentence.. and the district court rejected Landrigan's petition for habeas
corpus relief, Landrigan appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." 6
Landrigan's numerous postconviction appeals and petitions were based in part
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing trial counsel did not
investigate and introduce mitigating evidence during the trial and sentencing
phases."' At sentencing, Landrigan refused to allow his counsel to present
mitigation evidence.0 8 Only after sentencing did Landrigan state that he would
have cooperated with his trial counsel's efforts to present mitigating evidence
regarding his alleged genetic predisposition, had the issue been raised." 9
The three-judge appellate panel denied Landrigan's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate panel
determined that Landrigan had not only ignored his counsel's advice regarding
the introduction of mitigating evidence, but that he had actively thwarted his
trial counsel's efforts to present his case in an advantageous manner."' The
panel also noted the state courts' skepticism that Landrigan would have
permitted a defense that included mitigating genetics evidence, "given
Landrigan's apparently adamant insistence that mitigating evidence not be
presented" during trial."' Citing Mobley v. Head"2 and Turpin v. Mobley, "' the
panel emphasized that the "rather exotic.., genetic violence theory" proposing
that "Landrigan's biological background made him what he is" would not have
affected the outcome of his trial, even if the theory had been introduced." 4 As
the panel explained, "although Landrigan's new evidence can be called
mitigating in some slight sense, it would also have shown the court that it could
103. State v. Landrigan, 859 P.2d 111, 112 (Ariz. 1993).
104. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 460.
105. Landrigan, 859 P.2d at 118.
106. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1223.
107. According to an amended brief filed on January 8, 2001, mitigating factors would have included
evidence that "[Landrigan's] brain does not work the way it is supposed to due to genetics and in utero
exposure to alcohol and other toxic substances." Corrected Brief of Appellant at 22, Landrigan v.
Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-99011) [hereinafter Corrected Brief of Appellant]. This
condition "was exacerbated due to abandonment and other emotional detachments that [Landrigan]
experienced when he was a baby, as well as substance abuse as a youth and as an adult." Id.
108. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1225.
109. Id. at 1228.
110. Corrected Brief of Appellant, at 61. Landrigan's counsel on appeal argued that trial counsel
made only a minimal effort to gather mitigating evidence, and that "all the signals were there... to
recognize [Landrigan's brain dysfunction], conduct an investigation.., and present it to the court at the
sentencing hearing." Id.
111. Id.
112. 267 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
113. 502 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1998).
114. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228 n.4. Landrigan refuted the panel's reliance on the Mobley cases in
a subsequent supplemental brief. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Landrigan v.
Stewart, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 00-99011). Citing a wide range of research for support, the
brief emphasized that Landrigan's genetic predisposition does not render violent behavior a certainty,
but simply indicates a higher risk for antisocial tendencies. Id. at 1.
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anticipate that he would continue to be violent.""'  Given Landrigan's
reluctance to express remorse or provide the reasons for his crimes, "assuring
the court that genetics made him the way he is could not have been very
helpful. 5116
Following the appellate panel's decision, Landrigan filed petitions arguing
that the panel had erred in its consideration of "only one component of the
mitigating evidence: genetic predisposition to violence."'11 According to one
petition, Landrigan's "organic brain dysfunction" was not exclusively the result
of genetics, but also of his "in utero exposure to alcohol and other toxic
substances, and early disruptive relations in his biological and adoptive
families.""' 8 The petition also noted that the panel had ignored precedent in
which an Arizona trial court had considered a defendant's genetic history in its
imposition of life imprisonment rather than the death penalty."9 As a result,
the panel's reference to genetics evidence as a novel theory might indicate that
"the law has not caught up to the science."' 20 In addition, Landrigan took issue
with the appellate panel's implication that evidence of Landrigan's genetic
history did him more harm than good, since his history indicated a high
likelihood of "future dangerousness."'' Contending the panel had "converted
the mitigating evidence offered regarding Landrigan's biological and genetic
background from a shield into a sword," the petition noted that "future
dangerousness" is not a statutory aggravating circumstance under Arizona
law. 22
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that Landrigan's case
be reheard by the en banc court. 23 The final outcome could have implications
for other kinds of cases, irrespective of the types of genetics evidence they may
115. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1229.
116. Id.
117. Petitioner-Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 3, Landrigan v.
Stewart, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 00-99011) [hereinafter Petitioner-Appellant's Petition].
118. Id. Respondents-Appellees argued, however, that the appellate court properly limited its
consideration of mitigating factors to genetics evidence, since it was the only evidence presented to the
state court in support of Landrigan's ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the first post-
conviction relief proceeding. Respondents-Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 7-10, Landrigan v.
Stewart, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 00-99011).
119. State v. Eastlack, No. CR-28677 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 1997).
120. Petitioner-Appellant's Petition, at 13. In further support of this assertion, appellant's counsel
submitted a supplemental letter calling the court's attention to recent scholarship related to the use of
biopsychosocial research in the legal system. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law:
Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV.
631 (2004).
121. Petitioner-Appellant's Petition, at 14-15.
122. Id. at 16. Attorneys for the appellee responded by arguing that the appellate court did not
present the genetic predisposition as evidence of future dangerousness, but simply indicated it was
unlikely to have affected the outcome of the trial. Respondents-Appellees' Response to Petitioner-
Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 13, Landrigan v. Stewart, 397 F.3d
1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 00-99011).
123. Landrigan v. Stewart, 397 F.3d 1235, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005).
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use.12' Like Mobley, Landrigan touches on many of the key and varied issues
pertaining to the use of genetics evidence.
Before addressing more fully Landrigan's arguments and the broader
matter of how genetics evidence should play a role in the criminal justice
system, it is helpful to put Landrigan in context with other genetics and crime
cases. In Hendricks v. Calderon,2 ' the court remanded because defense counsel
had not offered mitigating evidence of the defendant's predisposition to mental
illness during the penalty phase.'26 In doing so, the court suggested that
mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's "difficult life" (including his
genetic predisposition to mental illness) might have affected the case's outcome
regarding sentencing."' This argument was at odds with the reasoning in
Benefiel, Landrigan, and Franklin, in which genetics evidence had been offered
and admitted.'28
Conversely, genetics evidence suggesting a predisposition to impulsive
behavior was proffered by the defendant's counsel but omitted by the trial court
in Cauthern v. State.'29 In rejecting the defendant's claim that he was prejudiced
by the omission of this mitigating evidence, the court noted that the defendant's
stepsiblings experienced similarly abusive upbringings but did not appear to
suffer from violent inclinations. 3 Alley v. State'3' was comparatively dismissive
of genetics evidence.'32 But the court readily accepted the testimony of medical
experts who saw no need to investigate the possibility of genetic problems
during their evaluation of the defendant despite their statements that he
suffered from various physical problems that could potentially "point to a
syndrome with genetic origin."'33 The experts' decision was particularly notable
given their acknowledgment that certain genetic conditions can potentially
influence people's behavior.'
124. See infra Part V.
125. 864 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995).
126. 70 F.3d at 1045. The court rejected the defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to present this same evidence during the guilt phase. Id.
127. Id.
128. The reasoning in Hendricks markedly contrasts with the arguments presented in State v.
Hartman, 476 S.E.2d 328 (N.C. 1996). Hartman argued the trial court's restructuring of his requested
jury instruction regarding his family history of alcoholism prevented the jury from considering relevant
mitigating evidence-specifically, Hartman's genetic predisposition to alcohol abuse. Id. at 342. The
trial court instead submitted the following instruction: "'Consider whether the defendant is an
alcoholic."' Id. Stated this way, Hartman posited, the jury "'was more likely' to view Hartman's
alcoholism "'simply as weakness or unmitigated choice."' Id. The court rejected this argument,
holding that a "catchall mitigating circumstance" instruction that had been submitted was sufficient to
address any such concerns. Id.
129. 145 S.W.3d 571,613 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
130. Id. at 609.
131. 958 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
132. Id. at 149-50.
133. Id. at 143.
134. Id.
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2. Proof and Diagnosis of Genetic Conditions
A second use of genetics evidence is to prove or support a diagnosis of a
genetic condition. The cases in which genetics evidence was employed for this
purpose demonstrate the challenges of applying legal principles to complex
scientific information. Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge3 mentions genetics
evidence in a different venue-the concurring opinion-which in that case
comments on the difficulty of distinguishing mental illness from "the myriad...
memories, experiences and genetic predispositions that go to make up each
individual's unique personality."1  The concurrence also emphasizes the
criminal justice system's difficulty in handling and interpreting mental health
issues: "We as judges and lawyers attempt to capture these philosophical
dilemmas in words that can have very different meanings to different people,
and that often may not respect the concepts that mental health professionals
would use to capture cognitive and volitional capacity. 137
The challenges arising when applying legal principles to scientific evidence
are well documented, and genetic variables are no exception.1 38 For one, courts
are reluctant to embrace genetics evidence, which may be due in part to the
seemingly arbitrary standards for determining what constitutes mitigation and
the vague criteria for diagnosis of genetic conditions. Even among the
relatively small number of cases analyzed in this article, for example, there is
great variety in the types of mitigating factors proposed.'39
In most cases in which the defendant's counsel offers genetics evidence, the
information consists almost wholly of the defendant's family history. 4 ' It stands
to reason, of course, that a defendant's family members could suffer from the
same genetic condition(s) as the defendant. Yet proof limited to family history
seems to invite responses such as that of the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals, which emphasized in Cauthern that the defendant's stepsiblings did
not suffer from the alleged predisposition. 4' Even in cases such as State v.
135. 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cit. 2004), cert. denied, stay denied, Dennis v. Budge, 542 U.S. 959 (2004).
136. Id. at 895.
137. Id.
138. See generally Denno, supra note 2, for an overview of some of these challenges.
139. See supra Chart 2; infra app. These types of mitigating factors include predispositions to
alcoholism, depression, impulsive behavior, violence, and aggression. See supra Chart 2 and supra note
71 (discussing the different types of genetics evidence). The conditions range from the specific (such as
XXY Syndrome, porphyria, and bipolar disorder) to the general (for example, mental disorders,
personality disorders, mood disorders, and "genetic defects"). See supra Chart 2 and supra note 81
(listing the ways genetics evidence validates the existence of serious conditions).
140. See, e.g., Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001) vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397
F. 3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), affg in part, rev'g in part, Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc); Hendricks v. Calderon, 864 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995);
People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. 1995); Sanchez v. Ryan, 734 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000);
State v. Hartman, 476 S.E.2d 328 (N.C. 1996); State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121,
792 N.E.2d 1081; Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Davis v. State, No.
M2003-00744-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 253396 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2004); State v. Maraschiello,
88 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
141. Cauthern, 145 S.W.3d at 609.
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Hughbanks,'42 in which the court acknowledged the negative effects of a family
history of mental illness on a defendant, such mitigating evidence does not
appear likely to affect the outcome of the case.143 In some circumstances,
proving a genetic predisposition through family history may even backfire. In
rejecting the defendant's ineffective assistance claim in Landrigan, the Ninth
Circuit stated: "It is highly doubtful that the sentencing court would have been
moved by information that [the defendant] was a remorseless, violent killer
because he was genetically programmed to be violent, as shown by the fact that
he comes from a family of violent people, who are killers also.""' Citing
Franklin,4 ' the Ninth Circuit further warned, "although [defendant's] new
evidence can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it would also have shown
the court that it could anticipate that he would continue to be violent."'4 6 Of
course, this argument takes on a double-edged-sword rationale that wrongly
presumes a genetic attribute is static. 4 ' Despite the questionable accuracy of
this presumption, such arguments appear to be highly persuasive to courts and
the public alike.
Nor does genetics evidence appear to flag the attention of the trial court
when proof other than family history is offered. In Arausa v. State, 48 the
defendant had requested appointment of a psychiatrist in part to help him
assess the mitigation value of a research study that indicated a genetic
predisposition among victims of abuse to become abusers.'49 The appellate
court skirted the genetics issue, finding no error in the trial court's rejecting the
defendant's request: the defendant's original request for a court-appointed
142. 99 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, at 136-37.
143. In Hughbanks, id. at 134, and at least two other cases, State v. Spivey, 692 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio
1998), and State v. Wilson, No. Civ.A. 92CA005396, 1994 WL 558568 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1994), the
courts did not expressly reject mitigating evidence regarding genetics, but held that the aggravating
circumstances of the crime outweighed any mitigating factors. Family history was not specifically
offered as proof of a genetics defense in Spivey and Wilson. Spivey involved a diagnosis of XYY
Syndrome. 692 N.E.2d at 165. A defense expert testified that although the syndrome itself does not
cause aggression, the defendant's family environment exacerbated his condition and resulted in his
criminal behavior. Id. Wilson merely listed the defendant's genetic predisposition to alcoholism
among the mitigating factors presented during the penalty phase, and offered no further information
concerning its origins. 1994 WL 558568, at *13 n.5.
144. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228-29.
145. People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. 1995).
146. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1229. The Franklin court further concluded the following:
The proffered evidence regarding defendant's psychological problems and his family's violent
and psychological history was not inherently mitigating. Although this evidence could have
evoked compassion in the jurors, it could have also demonstrated defendant's potential for
future dangerousness and the basis for defendant's past criminal acts. The evidence of
defendant's mental illness may also have shown that defendant was less deterrable or that
society needed to be protected from him.
656 N.E.2d at 761 (citations omitted).
147. See supra note 122 and accompanying text for other commentary on the double-edged-sword
dilemma in Landrigan; see infra Part V for further discussion of this issue in the context of additional
conceptual problems with the genetics evidence cases.
148. No. 07-02-0396-CR, 2003 WL 21803322 *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 6, 2003), affig State v. Arausa, No.
2002-439113 (Dist. Ct. Lubbock County July 5, 2002).
149. Id. at *2.
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medical health expert had been based on a need to analyze the defendant's
competency, not the research study."' In State v. Maraschiello,"' the defendant
claimed his genetic predisposition for a delusional disorder (as demonstrated by
his family history) was exacerbated by Gulf War Syndrome. 2 This appellate
court also followed the lead of the trial court in avoiding the matter of genetics.
The testimony pertaining to Gulf War Syndrome had been excluded on
unrelated grounds, and the defendant's alleged predisposition did not come up
again at trial (or on appeal).15 Only in Hendricks v. Calderon"M did an
appellate court consider it a mistake not to offer as mitigation evidence pretrial
hearing testimony on the defendant's genetic predisposition to mental illness
and its aggravation by an abusive childhood. 55
3. Future Dangerousness
Evidence regarding genetic predispositions brings with it the third use of
genetics evidence in the criminal law: the debate over the prediction of future
dangerousness,5 6 as discussed in Franklin157 and Landrigan"' In many of the
cases this article analyzes, genetics evidence takes the form of an individual's
predisposition toward some condition or behavior.5 9 This approach does not,
of course, guarantee the afflicted individual will develop that condition or
engage in that behavior; it indicates merely that the likelihood of occurrence
may be heightened. For example, in State v. Spivey,16 ° the doctor who
diagnosed the appellant with XYY Syndrome testified that this abnormality put
the defendant "at risk for committing criminal acts, but that the syndrome itself
did not cause him to be aggressive and to commit violent acts."' 61 Instead, the
defendant's family environment was faulted for triggering his preexisting
tendencies toward violence. 62
The issue of future dangerousness was explored in further detail in State v.
DeAngelo,'63 in which several psychiatrists evaluated the mental condition of an
150. Id. at *4.
151. 88 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
152. Id. at 599.
153. Id. at 599-611.
154. 864 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 934-35.
156. Future dangerousness and other issues raised by genetics evidence are discussed in People v.
Rodriguez, 764 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), which concerns defendants' privacy rights in the
context of the recent trend to collect DNA samples. See supra note 76 for a more detailed account of
Rodriguez.
157. People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750, 761 (Ill. 1995).
158. Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001) vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397
F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), affg in part, rev'g in part, Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir.
2006)(en banc).
159. See supra Chart 2; infra app.
160. 692 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1998).
161. Id. at 165.
162. Id.
163. No. CR 97010866S, 2000 WL 973104, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 2000).
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individual who had been acquitted of criminal charges because he was unable to
recognize or control the wrongfulness of his behavior.16 ' The evaluating experts
disagreed on their diagnoses and treatment recommendations for the
individual, as well as their assessment of the risk he posed to the public if
released. 6  The court ultimately determined the individual should be
committed to a maximum security psychiatric unit because he was a danger to
society. 6  As the court stated, "[p]sychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness, while of some value, must not be unduly relied upon. The
court's main concern must be the protection of society, and not necessarily
therapeutic goals."' 7
DeAngelo and comparable kinds of cases illustrate the strain between the
legal and mental health fields when they consider genetic information. Such
tension is accentuated because genetics evidence is typically introduced into
trials through testimony from mental health professionals.'68 Establishing
consistent criteria for assessing the expertise of these witnesses is therefore
likely to be a critical step toward the general acceptance of genetics evidence.
In DeAngelo,'69 for example, -the court questioned the credentials and
objectivity of at least one testifying psychiatrist. 7 In turn, the court in People
v. Hammerli7' likewise seemed dubious of the defense's expert witness
testimony.'72 The court emphasized that although the defendant's treating
psychiatrist had diagnosed the defendant with depression (yet had noted
improvement), all four defense experts "found defendant to be legally insane at
the time of the murder and were able with hindsight to fit defendant's actions
into their various diagnoses."'7 3 As the court explained, each of the experts
detected "in defendant's behavior facts to support [that expert's] own
opinion."'74 In Billiot v. State,75 the court exhibited a more overt lack of
deference toward the treating mental health expert, who diagnosed the
defendant with a genetic predisposition. Instead, the court relied on the
combined testimony of the majority of expert witnesses in determining that the
defendant was competent to be executed.' Acknowledging that the lone,
treating mental health expert who testified otherwise "had done more recent
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id. at *3-5.
166. Id. at *11.
167. Id.
168. See supra Chart 3; infra app.
169. 2000 WL 973104, at *1.
170. Id. at *11.
171. 662 N.E.2d 452 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
172. Id. at 458.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 13 (Miss. 1995) (stating that the expert's testimony was not
outcome-determinative, although the testimony reflected the broadest and most recent research on the
defendant).
176. Id. at 17.
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and more extensive research on the issue of [defendant's] sanity," the court
nonetheless refused to give that witness's testimony greater weight than that of
the other witnesses.177 In People v. Armstrong,"8 the court concluded that a
social worker had lacked the expertise to testify concerning the defendant's
genetic predisposition to alcoholism.'79  Perhaps Armstrong could be
interpreted as indicating that the genetic predisposition evidence might have
received greater consideration if the testifying witness had the necessary
expertise.
Even among qualified experts, however, conflicting diagnoses are another
factor likely to hinder general acceptance of genetics evidence. The drawbacks
of such incongruity are indicated in cases such as Hall v. State.80 In Hall,
psychologists for the defense testified that the defendant suffered from various
genetic afflictions; in contrast, the state's psychologist offered directly opposing
testimony, asserting that the defendant did not exhibit the symptoms of any
such disorders.' Not surprisingly, courts are quick to point out such
disparities. The DeAngelo82 court, for example, noted the psychiatrists'
inability to agree on a diagnosis of the defendant,'83 an outcome that
encouraged the court to have him committed.'"
Overall, this analysis of the last decade's twenty-seven genetics evidence
cases shows how courts generally have continued to constrain the admissibility
or use of genetic factors, even as mitigation in the penalty phase of a death
penalty trial. Thus, there is little to no indication that genetics evidence has
reinforced concerns expressed in the context of Mobley, most particularly
worries that actors in the criminal justice system would increasingly and
irresponsibly rely on such evidence in their decision-making. So far, evidentiary
rules and procedures continue to keep the evidence in such a safe place
substantively that a major concern may be that defendants do not have
available the full range of mitigating factors to which they are constitutionally
entitled in death penalty cases.
V
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In 1994, Mobley v. State'85 garnered substantial notice because of defense
counsel's strenuous efforts to test for genetics evidence for mitigation in
177. Id. at 13.
178. 700 N.E.2d 960 (I11. 998).
179. Id. at 970.
180. 160 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
181. Id. at 30.
182. No. CR 97010866S, 2000 WL 973104 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 2000).
183. Id. at *11.
184. Id.
185. 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995).
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Stephen Mobley's death penalty case." 6 According to some commentators at
the time, if such testing had been allowed, it could encourage political and
moral abuses of such highly controversial information."" Yet the survey here of
the twenty-seven cases that have used genetics evidence in the decade following
Mobley shows no apparent basis for these worries. 8' Genetics evidence is
seldom offered. When attorneys do attempt to introduce it during the penalty
phase of a death penalty trial, most courts still question its applicability.
In essence, since Mobley, little has changed legally in the area of genetics
and crime. The topic remains controversial for many of the same reasons it did
ten years ago."' Likewise, the press and public still seem confused about the
meaning and role of mitigating evidence in death penalty cases.'
186. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
187. See Denno, supra note 2, at 254 (outlining the political and moral concerns over genetics
evidence); see also supra note 12 (discussing potential abuses in the context of the Mobley case); infra
note 189 (discussing potential abuses in the context of the 1995 University of Maryland conference on
The Meaning and Significance of Research on Genetics and Criminal Behavior).
188. See supra Part IV; infra app.
189. Few conferences on the topic of genetics and crime have occurred since the Ciba symposium.
For example, shortly after the Ciba symposium took place, the University of Maryland held a
conference on The Meaning and Significance of Research on Genetics and Criminal Behavior. David
Wasserman, a legal scholar and organizer of the conference, noted at the time, "There are a hell of a lot
of people attending this conference who think the dangers of genetic research are as great in the long
term as the dangers of atomic energy." Pezzella, supra note 3; see also Wade Roush, Conflict Marks
Crime Conference, 269 SCIENCE 1808, 1808 (1995) ("The [Maryland] conference.., has been protested,
canceled, rescheduled, and otherwise dogged by controversy ever since it was first planned .... ").
Previously, the conference had been cancelled because of the controversial nature of the topic.
Abraham, supra note 2 ("In 1992, just a year before Mr. Summer seized on the Dutch family study, the
U.S. National Institutes of Health cancelled a conference on crime and genetics at the University of
Maryland after black groups protested that such research was racially motivated."); Cookson, supra
note 16, at 8 ("Public pressure forced the US National Institutes of Health to cancel a conference on
[genetics and behavior] in 1992 after opponents of the research detected racial overtones in some of the
proposed contributions."); Pezzella, supra note 3 ("Even participants [of the Maryland conference]
found the meeting somewhat distasteful. Paul R. Billings, a professor at Stanford University... said he
feared the current concentration on genetics could bring back the kind of eugenics movement that was
espoused by the Nazis."); Richard W. Stevenson, Researchers See Gene Link To Violence But Are
Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 29 ("[The Maryland] conference was called off after critics said that
it was too accepting of the idea that inherited personality traits were the primary causes of crime and
violence and that it would promote the notion that criminals could be identified by genetic markers.");
Tom Wilkie, Scientist Denounces Criminal Gene Theory, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 13, 1995,
HOME, at 2 ("' [The Maryland conference] was seen as overtly racist."').
.190. This confusion was particularly apparent at the time of the Stephen Mobley case. Some news
media referred to the genetics evidence as a culpability defense, not as a basis for mitigation. See
Moosajee, supra note 12, at 213; Robert Davis, 'We Live in an Age of Exotic Defenses', USA TODAY,
Nov. 22, 1994, at 1A ("Stephen Mobley blames his genes for making him kill .... [E]xperts say these
defenses are typical of the bizarre and unusual rationales that increasingly are being heard in
courtrooms across the USA as defendants try to find something-anything-to blame."); Felsenthal,
supra note 3 ("In a novel and highly controversial defense, [Mobley's lawyers] are arguing that Mr.
Mobley's genes may have predisposed him to commit crimes."); Holmquist, supra note 2; Marrin, supra
note 2. But see Abraham, supra note 2 ("[P]eople are concerned [the argument] nullifies the idea of
free will and responsibility. But I'm not using it as a defence, per se, but as a mitigating factor-you
know, 'If you're thinking about putting this guy to death, think about this."')(quoting Daniel Summer);
Connor, supra note 2 ("'There is no legal defence to his crime,' says... Mobley's attorney. 'There is
only the mitigating factor of his family history."'). On occasion, the media also assumed Mobley
founded his appeal on having a genetic disorder, although the appeal was based on the denial of his
motion for funding to test for any genetic disorder. See Boseley, supra note 3; Malik, supra note 12.
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A key question remains, however. What is the overall framework courts use
to rationalize their skepticism regarding genetics evidence? Not all courts have
viewed genetics evidence negatively. In Von Dohlen v. State,19 for example, the
court considered such information (in conjunction with other evidence)
sufficiently compelling to remand the defendant's case for resentencing: the
defendant's counsel had not provided a testifying expert with records that
indicated, among other things, the defendant's genetic predisposition for mental
disorder. 92 Von Dohlen is one of a number of exceptions, 9 ' however, among a
larger group of cases that have rendered genetics evidence insignificant.
Like Mobley, courts have provided various reasons for excluding a
defendant's offer of genetics information, including the following: (1) counsel
had already submitted sufficient mitigation evidence and additional data on the
defendant's genetic proclivities would probably not have affected the outcome
of the defendant's case;.. (2) genetics evidence has questionable credibility
when compared to other evidence introduced at trial,' particularly when
testimony from different experts conflicts; 96 (3) the theory of a link between
genetics and violence is "unorthodox" '' or "exotic"; 9. (4) genetics evidence
can cut against a defendant's case because it suggests the defendant will
continue to be violent; 99 and (5) genetics evidence does not comport with some
courts' theories of criminal responsibility, which may emphasize, for example,
the protection of society over "therapeutic goals."2 °
There is little or negligible foundation for any of these five rationales,
however. First, there is only a fragile basis for questioning the credibility or
impact of genetics evidence when such evidence is so rarely admitted into court.
Indeed, part of the controversy over the admissibility of genetics research has
usually involved the opposite claim-that because of its aura of scientific
sophistication and precision, genetics information would weigh too heavily on a
jury and have a disproportionate effect on a case's disposition. The extent of
191. 602 S.E.2d 738 (S.C. 2004), cert. denied, South Carolina v. Von Dohlen, No. 04-937, 2005 U.S.
LEXIS 2695 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005).
192. Id. at 741-46.
193. See also supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing Hendricks v. Calderon, 864 F.
Supp. 929 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995) and Fudge v. State, 120 S.W.3d. 600
(Ark. 2003)). See also infra app.
194. See, e.g., Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397
F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), affg in part, rev'g in part, Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc); Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995); People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. 1995);
State v. Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485 (Mo. 2000).
195. People v. Hammerli, 662 N.E.2d 452, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d
571 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
196. Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied, Hall v. Texas, No. 04-8762,
2005 U.S. LEXIS 5073 (U.S. June 27, 2005).
197. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 463 (Ga. 1998).
198. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228 n.4.
199. Id. at 1229.
200. State v. DeAngelo, No. CR 97010866S, 2000 WL 973104, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20,
2000).
[Vol. 69:209
HeinOnline  -- 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 236 2006
REVISITING THE LEGAL LINK
this influence would be particularly significant if the evidence were compared to
other, more traditionally accepted, mitigating information."' For example,
there are compelling arguments that some genetics evidence could be relevant
and useful if applied in a limited way, such as buttressing other proffered
mitigating conditions,02 as in cases when the defendant's veracity concerning
the existence of a condition is questioned.0 3
Likewise, courts' rendering of genetic factors as "unorthodox" or "exotic" is
ironic, given that courts themselves perpetuate this supposed status of
unusualness. Regardless, a factor need not be conventional in order for it to be
considered mitigating. The claim of "exoticism" is also dubious on its face.
Genetics evidence has a long history in legal cases, " even if that past was
controversial or has seemingly been forgotten by modern courts, such as those
deciding Mobley v. State05 and Landrigan v. Stewart."'
The double-edged-sword aspect of genetics evidence stressed by some
courts0 7 has also long been acknowledged. But this dilemma characterizes
many other mitigating factors, for example, those available to juvenile
offenders. In Roper v. Simmons,0 8 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of persons aged younger
than eighteen at the time their crimes were committed. 9 The Court reasoned
that relative to adults, juveniles are more immature and irresponsible,
vulnerable to negative pressures from their peers and environment, and fragile
and unstable in their identities.1 Although these disparities explained why
juveniles may be less culpable, they also heightened the likelihood that
juveniles would engage in impulsive thinking and criminality.211 In other words,
the very factors that argued against juveniles' eligibility for the death penalty
also made them more prone to misconduct. Youth can be a double-edged
sword, although the Court has taken steps to contain that possibility.
Similarly, courts that exclude genetics evidence because it does not mesh
with their theory of criminal responsibility seemingly confuse the requirements
for mitigating evidence with other criminal law doctrines. This problem also
201. Denno, supra note 2, at 253-54; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the
five stated problems concerning the use of genetics evidence in criminal cases).
202. See supra note 81 (listing the ways that genetics evidence validates the existence of a serious
condition); infra app.
203. See infra app. (listing Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) and Billiot v.
State, 655 So. 2d 1, 8 (Miss. 1995)).
204. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
205. 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995).
206. 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), affg
in part, rev'g in part, Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
207. See Denno, supra note 2, at 254; supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the double-
edged-sword issue in the context of the Landrigan case).
208. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
209. Id. at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.").
210. Id. at 569-70.
211. Id.
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arose when the media covered the Mobley case. Basically, some journalists and
commentators treated mitigation in a death penalty case synonymously with
criminal defenses pertaining to a defendant's culpability. 12 The admissibility
criteria for mitigation, however, are far more encompassing than criminal
defenses because the criteria serve substantially different goals. 13
Part of the general difficulty with these cases also involves courts' apparent
ignorance of the interactions among social, biological, and genetic variables.
This oversight is exemplified in Landrigan v. Stewart.14 The defendant's
counsel noted that Landrigan's "organic brain dysfunction" stemmed from the
effects of both genetic and environmental sources;"' yet the court primarily
emphasized the exclusion of the genetics component. 1 As this article has
noted, however, biological, genetic, and social variables are highly interactive
and difficult to separate without creating artificial categories. 7
Overall, this article has taken a relatively narrow view of the use of genetics
evidence, thereby excluding or limiting a number of topics of interest: (1) the
question of whether such evidence should be applied outside the context of
mitigation in death penalty cases; (2) the doctrinal differences in how the
evidence has been implemented within the mitigation context (for example, the
differences between the evidentiary requirements necessary for proving a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel as opposed to future dangerousness); (3) a
comparison of courts' treatment of genetic factors with other kinds of social and
behavioral research (even though much of the criticism of genetics evidence
could pertain to social science evidence in general); (4) a comparison of the
different types of genetics factors used in cases; or (5) an analysis of the broader
philosophical debates and exchanges concerning the role of genetic factors in
the criminal justice system and theoretical models of criminal responsibility.
All these issues are significant, but they exceed this article's scope.
At the same time, the topic of genetics and crime will not go away.
Although courts do not appear to be exploiting genetics information in the way
commentators on Mobley feared, the criminal justice system still lacks a sound
conceptual framework for handling genetics research no matter what it decides
to do with it. The warnings of the past are important to heed. As surveyed
attorneys agreed over a decade ago in the context of Mobley, "the question is
not if this kind of genetic testing is admissible as mitigating evidence in criminal
trials, but when."21
212. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
214. 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), affg
in part, rev'g in part, Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
215. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
218. Mark Curriden, His Lawyer Says It's in the Killer's Genes, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at A12.
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